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Abstract  
Systems engineering involves both the integration of the system and the integration of the disciplines which develop 
and operate the system.  Integrating the disciplines is a sociological effort to bring together different groups, often 
with different terminology, to achieve a common goal, the system.  The focus for the systems engineer is information 
flow through the organization, between the disciplines, to ensure the system is developed and operated with all relevant 
information informing system decisions. Robert K. Merton studied the sociological principles of the sciences and the 
sociological principles he developed apply to systems engineering.  Concepts such as specification of ignorance, 
common terminology, opportunity structures, role-sets, and the reclama (reconsideration) process are all important 
sociological approaches that should be employed by the systems engineer.  In bringing the disciplines together, the 
systems engineer must also be wary of social ambivalence, social anomie, social dysfunction, insider-outsider 
behavior, unintended consequences, and the self-fulfilling prophecy.   These sociological principles provide the 
systems engineer with key approaches to manage the information flow through the organization as the disciplines are 
integrated and share their information. This also helps identify key sociological barriers to information flow through 
the organization.  This paper will discuss this theoretical basis for the application of sociological principles to systems 
engineering. 
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Introduction 
Systems engineering is responsible for integrating the various disciplines within an organization to develop or operate 
a system. This aspect is a parallel aspect with system integration which involves understanding the system’s integrating 
physics. If you understand the system, but not the organization structure and interrelationships you may never get the 
system developed. If you understand the organization but not the system’s discipline and integrating physics, the 
system will not work. Systems engineering must deal with both aspects to design an elegant system. 
Discipline integration is a highly sociological function and brings in aspects not traditionally thought of as engineering. 
These sociological aspects are essential as complex systems are developed by complex organization (the organizations 
are complex social systems). The systems engineer must understand how the organization is structured, how 
communication flows, and how information about the system is maintained. Information maintained within the 
organization is not always readily identified in the system design, managing this is a crucial role of systems engineers. 
Disciplines are reservoirs of information, information which they generate and maintain. The systems engineer 
manages the channels between these reservoirs ensuring the right information is provided to the right discipline when 
needed. Systems engineering applies many sociological functions in the development or operation of a system. 
 
Opportunity Structures 
Opportunity structures provide pathways for individuals advancement toward social goals in a social system.  (Merton, 
1996, pp. 153-161) Systems engineering is concerned with information flow about the system through the 
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organization. The opportunity for advancement of system design and operations ideas is an important social aspect of 
engineering.  Systems engineering provides appropriate opportunity structures  for the maturing of these design 
concepts and ideas as part of discipline integration. These structures include technical review forums (such as status 
meetings separate from decision making structures), task teams, working groups, communities of practice, etc. where 
new ideas can be explained, discussed, challenged, and matured leading to a fully formed idea for the formal decision 
making process.  Note, that decision boards are idea filters, not opportunity structures.  These boards select ideas that 
have been matured to the appropriate point for selection and they stop more ideas than they approve as the perform 
their selection as part of the decision making process.  The opportunity structures provide the structure within the 
organization for new ideas to be developed and vetted, maturing them to the point where they can be discussed as an 
option by the decision board. 
 
Systems Engineering Role-Sets 
The systems engineer has a set of roles within the organization. This role-set (Merton, 1996, pp. 44, 113-122) includes 
system expert (in system interactions), system analyst, discipline integrator, team leader (study teams, task teams, 
etc.), advisor (to the program manager, chief engineer), and employee (to line management). These are not different 
roles conducted by the same individual but a set of roles associated with the position of systems engineer within the 
system design or operation.  
 
System Terminology 
Consistent use of terminology is important within the sociological function of systems engineering. Terms 
communicate ideas within an organization and can develop specialized meaning within certain cultures. Systems 
engineering ensures that terms are used with consistent and recognized (agreed to) meaning.  Using different terms 
for the same meaning creates confusion in the organization and can lead to unanticipated system design or operation 
errors. Similarly, having a single term represent different meanings in different contexts also leads to organizational 
confusion and system design or operations errors. Systems engineering should avoid both situations that can occur in 
discipline integration. The focus is not on changing the discipline terminology by translating the various discipline 
terminologies so that a common understanding of the system is reflected in terminology at the system level. 
The mathematics of the engineering solution provides an integrating medium of the discipline contributions for 
systems engineering. Mathematical solutions are built on various contributions by the differing disciplines. The 
mathematics captures and retains these contributions in the solutions. They are not lost but form an essential part of 
the engineering solution. As such, the mathematical relationships provide the systems engineer a mechanism to 
understand and measure the balance of a system, translating the discipline terminology through the mathematics.   
 
Specification of Ignorance 
Understanding of system interactions, sensitivities, and uncertainties requires application of sociological specification 
of ignorance. This is defined as “the express recognition of what is not yet known but needs to be known to lay the 
foundation for still more knowledge” (Merton, 1996, pp. 51-56) of the system. Systems engineering needs to know 
what is not understood about the system as well as what is understood. This fosters system analysis to gain 
understanding of these interactions, sensitivities, and uncertainties that are not defined. This also supports systems 
engineering identification of unknown unknowns as the understanding of the system expands. Sociologically, analysis 
is not conducted on areas that are believed to be known or areas that are not known to be unknown. Practicing the 
specification of ignorance enables the system engineer to identify areas that may otherwise be overlooked within in 
the organizational culture. 
 
Socially Expected Durations 
Socially expected durations play a big role in how people within the organization behave and react to the progress on 
the system development or operation. These expected durations are not actual durations and can be quite different. 
There are three kinds of expected durations: Structural or institutionally defined (socially prescribed) expectations; 
collectively expected; and patterend temporal expectations. (Merton, 1996, pp. 162-169)  
Socially prescribed durations are the formal system schedules and timelines.  Organizational authorities responsible 
for the systems establish these formal system schedules and timelines that engineers within the organization recognize. 
Collectively expected durations are a second type and are uncertain in terms of being able to specifically write them 
down. They are the collective attitude of a development organization or discipline in how they anticipate the 
development to proceed. Systems engineering is attuned to differences in the prescribed and collectively expected 
durations. These can indicate problems with the schedule and may indicate that an overly ambitious schedule has been 
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established based on experience. There should be good engineering rationale associated with the formal system 
schedule with agreement from the disciplines that they can achieve the durations.  The opposite can also occur, where 
the prescribed schedule is much longer than the collectively expected schedule. This can indicate problems in 
equipment availability, skills availability, funding availability, etc. This can also indicate the system is not achievable 
when needed which keys a review of the projects viability. The third kind of expected duration is patterned temporal 
expectations. These types of durations occur in areas such as contracting, business transactions, reorganizations, etc. 
There is an expectation of how long an agreement or transaction should take to be finalized based on cultural history 
and experience.  
Socially expected durations drive how people behave within the organization. If they expect a short time 
frame, they may accelerate contributing efforts. If they expect a long time frame, they may slow down or procrastinate 
contributing efforts. Systems engineering ensures that the contributions provided by the disciplines are made in a 
timely manner maintaining a balance in the organizations effort as it progresses on the system schedule. 
 
Cultural Subsets 
Part of the complication of discipline integration is the cultural subsets that exist for each discipline.  Each discipline 
contains a unique set of understandings and terminology for their discipline. Often different terms are used for similar, 
not necessarily the same, meanings. The same term may also be used for different meanings. Note that within the 
discipline the meanings are consistent but across the disciplines they are not. Systems engineering must translate the 
differing cultural meanings into a consistent terminology and understanding across the entire organization. Within 
each discipline, various cultural aspects can also make discipline integration challenging. The different disciplines 
typically have different team structures or processes and may use team structures or processes in different ways or 
view the significance of a team structure or process differently. Systems engineering functions to create a blended 
team structure across the disciplines where communication and information can flow without misunderstanding in 
meaning or significance of an activity. 
 
Manifest and Latent Social Functions 
Both manifest and latent social functions will be present in discipline integration. (Merton, 1957, pp. 60-69) Manifest 
social functions are defined as “objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the social 
system which are intended and recognized by participations in the social system” (Merton, 1996, pp. 87-95). Written 
norms of conduct which are adhered to by those in the organization (adherence is the important distinction) are an 
example of manifest social functions. Unwritten norms which are adhered to by those in the organization are also 
manifest social functions. Latent functions are defined as “those [social functions] which are neither intended nor 
recognized.” (Merton, 1996, pp. 87-95) These are difficult to identify and are not clearly seen by those in the 
organization. Organizational biases against certain solutions or approaches can be a latent social function. These can 
lead to positive or negative system impacts yet no one in the organization recognizes the bias. The result of the 
organizational actions can demonstrate the bias against an aspect. The systems engineer must be alert for these effects 
and work with organizational line management and program management to address manifest or latent functions which 
have a negative (limit or defeat) impact on the elegance of the system design or operation.   
 
Social Dysfunctions 
Social dysfunction is “any process that undermines the stability or survival of a social system” (Merton, 1996, pp. 96-
100).  Systems engineering helps to mitigate dysfunctions that can cause information about the system to be suppressed 
or inaccurately communicated. These dysfunctions are a risk factor for the system and can greatly affect the ability of 
an organization to accomplish a given system design or operation.  Note, that innovative approaches to accomplishing 
a system can be very disruptive to organizations sociological values. This can mean that a given organizational culture 
is not able to develop the system which embodies values contrary to what the organization has come to believe as 
most important. Innovative system approaches often entail the formation of an entirely new organizational structure 
and culture with a different view on what is most significant in the system. Examples can be found in various industries 
including the computer industry (mainframe vs networked workstations), heavy equipment industry (steam driven 
systems vs hydraulic systems), medical practice, etc. (Christensen , 2003)  Automation of previously manual 
operations is a current topic in the United States culture (i.e., anxiety toward drone applications).   
 
Social Ambivalence 
Sociological ambivalence is an “incompatible normative expectation of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior assigned to a 
social status (i.e., position) or a set of statuses in a society”. (Merton, 1996, pp. 123-131) An ambivalence can be 
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created if a discipline or position within the organization is confronted with conflicting norms. Manifest and latent 
functions can lead to these conditions at times. This condition can pose a threat to the system’s success. There are six 
(6) types of sociological ambivalence (quotes in this list are taken from Merton (1996, pp. 123-131):   
1.  “Inherent in the social position”  
Government employee relationships with contractors are an example where government ethics demands 
disinterest while social etiquette requires personal interest.    
   
2.  “A conflict of interests or values” 
These may arise when a person is a member of two different organizations such as in a matrix 
organizational structure or when a person is working two projects. If the normative values are different 
the person can become socially ambivalent. For example, when one project norm is to do what it takes to 
solve a problem conflicts with the time agreed to spend on another project. A conflict in time priority 
arises where one cannot satisfy both norms. These can also arise between organizational values and values 
from a person’s life outside the organization.  
  
3.  “Conflict between roles associated with a particular” position 
These are conflicts in cultural norms that occur inherent to a given job position. These can occur in 
discipline integration where a representative to the system team may find oneself in conflict between 
norms of the system team and norms of their discipline team. Another example may be in procurement, 
balancing the norms of the procurement office with that of what the program views as necessary for 
success. 
 
4.  “Contradictory cultural values” 
These can be a risk to the system and occur when different cultural values collide. For example, an 
emphasis on high reliability can conflict with the need for techniques seen as not credible. This takes 
special effort to determine the engineering basis for the view that the technique is not credible in the 
specific context of application, and that the engineering basis that the technique will improve reliability. 
As discussed below, mathematics provides an integrating function for social functions and should be used 
in evaluating these types of conflicts. Look for engineering representations, not subjective logic. 
 
5.  “The disjunction between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing 
these aspirations”  
This illustrates a disconnect between social expectations and the structure to achieve these expectations. 
An example is when a quick change is needed in the system design or operation and the organizational 
structure does not support a quick assessment and implementation of the change. The engineer is faced 
with either allowing a larger impact to the system later or moving ahead of approval with a change. 
Systems engineering is to ensure that the decision-making structures are efficient and that mechanisms 
are in place for the types of disjunctions in this example (e.g., Reclama processes discussed below). 
 
6.  That which “develops among people who have lived in two or more societies and so have become oriented 
to differing set of cultural values” 
This occurs when an engineer worked in different disciplines or supported projects with very different 
cultural values. The varying cultural values experienced can lead to ambivalence to cultural values in the 
current system that conflict or contradict what has been successful in the engineer’s past. This can lead 
to a strong disinterest in the social structure of the system development or operation. These types of issues 
should be brought to line management or project management (at the appropriate level) to address. It is 
important that the members of the organization have an agreed to set of values or sociological dysfunction 
can develop within the sociological structure of the organization.   
 
Sociological ambivalence can lead to a failure to deal with or possibly to acknowledge conditions that affect 
system reliability and success. Systems engineering must be aware of these conditions when they occur in the 
organization and seek to find a new balance for the norms. This may involve the precedence of conflicting norms 
elevating one as more prominent to resolve a conflict or finding a common understanding that balances the norms, 
and addressing the concerns that may be suppressed in the ambivalent situation. 
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Social Adaptation and Social Anomie 
There are five (5) types of individual adaptations to the social structure.  These adaptations cover the full range of 
individual responses to the organizational structure and project goals. (Merton, 1996, pp. 132-153) and (Irmak & Ҫam, 
2014, pp. 1297-1305)  These can be either healthy or unhealthy depending on the specific context of the situation. The 
systems engineer interest is in how these different approaches affect the flow of information about the system.  As 
individuals feel less supported by the organizational and project structures they have varied responses to trying to 
achieve the project goals. Social Anomie is the most extreme condition discussed briefly at the end of the list of social 
adaptations. 
1.  Conformity 
Most people seek to conform to the cultural norms and the social structure to achieve these norms. They 
will try to stay within these bounds as they work in the organization. 
 
2.  Innovation 
Individuals caught in a conflict between the cultural norms and social structure may try to create a new 
path through the social structure. This typically involves violating some minor cultural norm or 
organizational constraint to resolve the conflict (or organizational pinch) that they are in. An example 
may be in skipping a level in the chain of command or bypassing an approval cycle to move forward. 
There are many more creative ways that people may find to move forward in satisfying a cultural norm 
that the social structure is not facilitating. Social structure in this case would include the formal approval 
cycle (e.g., decision making boards).  
 
3.  Ritualism 
In some cases, the frustration in conflicts can lead to an abandonment or reduction in importance to 
achieving a cultural norm leading to a ritualistic following of the organizational structure processes. This 
can be dangerous to the system as ambivalence has developed and conflicts in the system design or 
operation may not be identified as discussed above. 
  
4.  Retreatism 
Occasionally an individual will retreat from both the cultural norms and the organizational structure. A 
person who is in such an ambivalent situation simply withdraws from significant participation in the 
system development or design. When this occurs, the person should seek a different position in the project 
or with another project where the conflict they have encountered does not exist. These cases should be 
discussed with line management or project management at an appropriate level. Systems engineering is 
focused on the success of the system. When these deep sociological conflicts develop, line management 
is primarily responsible to help the individual deal with the conflict. Systems engineering is responsible 
to ensure the conflict does not indicate an issue in organizational culture values or structure that needs to 
be addressed.    
 
5.  Rebellion 
This is the most radical of the responses to sociological anomie situations. Rebellion is a strong form of 
social dysfunction attempting to bring about a new social structure within the organization. This can occur 
in cases were an organization views the success of system based on different values than are required for 
the system in application. This can occur when a traditional organization attempts to adapt to a disruptive 
technological approach. As discussed above, this may mean the organization is not suited to the system 
development or operation. (Christensen, 2003) 
 
An extreme sociologically ambivalent context leads to sociological anomie. In this case an individual in the 
culture can become normless or rootless.(Merton, 1996, pp. 132-152) A no win situation has been perceived where an 
individual moves outside the organizational structure, opposes the organizational norms, to achieve what the 
sociological culture call for and the organizational structure is preventing. This imbalance occurs when the emphasis 
on success-goals of the system are much greater than the emphasis on the institutional means to achieve these goals. 
 
Engineering Reclama 
The engineering reconsideration process (sometimes referred to as a reclama process) is one means by which to 
accommodate individuals caught in these difficult social norm conflicts. The systems engineer should ensure that an 
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effective reconsideration path is available and impartial to the social norms. The use of line management can be an 
avenue unless the line management is driven by the same cultural norms (both manifest and latent) as the system 
development or operation organization. In these cases, other pathways (external organization, external arbiter, etc.) 
will need to be found for relief of the anomie generating situations. This is important to the system success as major 
failures have occurred in systems where effective reconsideration paths were not available or went through a chain 
driven by the same cultural norms that generated the conflict. (e.g., see CAIB,(2003) or the Rogers Commission Report 
(1986)). 
 
Self-Fulling Prophecy 
One possible response to social ambivalence, dysfunction, and anomie is in the self-fulfilling prophecy.(Merton, 1996, 
pp. 183-201) This sociological concept deals with the expected behavior of a group.  If the culture defines a group as 
socially different, the organization can establish expectations and ascribed motives to the group, whether they 
accurately describe the group or not. The organization interprets the actions of the group in terms of the organizations 
expectation and ascribed motives. Thus, no matter how the group behaves, their actions always “confirm” the 
expectations of others in the organization. This form of prejudice or bias can lead to serious limitations of the system 
and certain disciplines, organizational units, or engineering approaches can be shunned by the organization even when 
a needed and positive contribution is offered. Sociologically, “the self-fulfilling prophecy where fears are translated 
into reality operates only in the absence of deliberate institutional control.” (Merton, 1996, p. 200) Thus, systems 
engineering needs to be aware of these types of bias and ensure that the organization controls the social biases that 
may be expressed. Testing these biases against a sound engineering basis is a good method to help identify and control 
this bias. This is one sociological reason why the engineering reconsideration system may need to be outside the 
development or operational organization. 
 
Social Groups 
Different sets of knowledge exist in different social groups (i.e., disciplines or organizations). This is not just technical 
knowledge but all kinds of cultural knowledge including history of various efforts. Access to knowledge is free in 
most societies, but it is not practical or possible for a single individual to have all knowledge. This leads to the 
formation of small groups of knowledge within a society. Within engineering, these are the disciplines. As systems 
become more complex, the ability to contain all knowledge of the system by a single individual is quickly surpassed 
and a larger group is needed. Thus, for most system developments or system operations, the knowledge of the system 
is contained by the organization and not just an individual. This is a natural sociological function and can be a very 
positive social structure when used cooperatively.   
Sometimes, though, the differences in beliefs brought about by the different knowledge sets in each group 
can lead to contradictions in beliefs between the groups. These can be beliefs on which configuration or version is 
best, which approach will or will not work, and even how the project should be managed. When this happens the 
communication between the groups can break down and a strong distrust between the groups can develop. In its 
extreme, this leads to a questioning not of why the belief of the other group is wrong, but a questioning of what is 
their motive to bring such a “palpably implausible” belief statement into the discussion (Merton, 1996, pp. 205-222). 
This social polarization greatly hinders the progress on the system and can defeat the elegance of the system as effort 
is spent managing social conflicts within the organization rather than attention to elegant solutions for the system. 
Polarized political beliefs are a good example of this phenomenon.   
Social polarization leads to functionalization of thought interpreted only “in terms of its presumed social or 
economic or psychological sources and functions.” This can lead to an exclusive view of information or knowledge 
contained by a group (i.e., “insiders”) with others viewed as “outsiders” (Merton, 1996, pp. 241-263). This also sets 
up a self-fulfilling prophecy about those outside the group being unable to understand the knowledge possessed by 
the insiders. A monopolistic view of knowledge contained by the insiders is maintained breaking down communication 
altogether with outsider groups. The belief becomes one that you must be an insider to understand the knowledge or 
situation. The outsider groups are assumed to have different beliefs even when this is not true (Merton, 1996, pp. 241-
263). 
Systems engineering takes action to mediate these different beliefs and to foster trust within the organization, 
among the disciplines, and with external organizations. Openness to discussion and allowing expression of beliefs to 
be made is important in this difficult context. Seeking points of commonality is a starting point to bring the groups to 
a common understanding. Note, there are individuals who may not be able to move past the distrust due to their own 
personal experiences, relationships, etc. This can also occur at the organizational level indicating that a group or 
organization may not be compatible for some reason. Changing a group or groups, if possible, can be a solution if an 
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alternative is available. Normally competing organizations attempting to work together can experience this very 
strongly.   
 
Minimize Unintended Consequences 
The systems engineer must manage the sources that lead to unintended consequences. Unintended consequences are 
based on human action or inaction resulting in unanticipated outcomes. The systems integrating physics do not fail; 
we simply do not always recognize the consequences of our actions/decisions. Robert Merton (1936) developed five 
(5) sources of unintended consequences that provide a framework to understand and manage these difficult results. 
 
Ignorance 
Ignorance is a limited knowledge of the problem leading to unexpected performance (i.e., anomalous) or failure of the 
system. Failing to understand the system’s interactions within itself and with its environment is a major source of 
ignorance leading to poor (though not realized) design decisions. Often the engineering and science is not well 
understood and the system models do not capture these interactions. The systems engineer must realize where 
knowledge is lacking and manage the risks, uncertainties, and sensitivities to these unknown or poorly understood 
interactions. Conducting tests, where possible, provides a method to reduce the ignorance in system interactions. 
Validation of models is also a crucial method to reduce the uncertainty in the system models used for design and 
operation. 
Another form of ignorance is on the effect of the system, its fabrication, or its operation in the environment 
or local cultures. This can lead to effects which limit or eliminate design, fabrication, or operational configuration 
options. This requires a good understanding of policies and laws (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency regulations). 
 
Historical Precedent 
Historical precedent (i.e., confirmation bias) is characterized by expecting previous efforts to result in the same 
outcomes. This bias often overlooks the changes that may make the previous efforts inapplicable. This is frequently 
encountered when using “heritage” components in similar applications. These components will need to be re-qualified 
for the new applications and new environments which often leads to design changes. NASA cost models are generally 
based on historical precedents and are frequently inaccurate due to the presence of this unrecognized bias. New 
methods, procedures, and materials change the basis of the cost models but were not anticipated in the previous efforts 
and are not explicit in the model structure. This bias can be mitigated by recognizing the differences in the system 
application and environments from previous uses and accounting for these differences in the design, budget, schedule, 
and operations.  
 
Error 
Errors are simply undetected mistakes in the design or operation of a system. This encompasses mistakes in 
calculations, mistakes in communications, and working from habit. Error is different from ignorance in that the correct 
solution is known but not implemented. The systems engineer should recognize the sources of error and develop 
checks for these. Verification and validation are part of the checks for errors in design. Model validation plays a crucial 
part in ensuring that the model accurately represents the systems integrating physics or logic (software) of the system. 
In complex designs, independent evaluations provide a check against errors in the system. This is often done for 
critical software. 
Communication errors are a significant concern in organizational information flow. The systems engineer 
should ensure that the correct information is provided to the designers and decision makers for the design to achieve 
the intended consequences. If inaccurate or incomplete information is allowed to propagate through the organizational 
structure, design or operation decisions can be adversely affected resulting in unintended consequences.  
 
Short-Sightedness 
Short-sightedness (what Robert Merton called the “imperious immediacy of interest” (1936)) is focusing on near term 
consequences and ignoring long-term consequences. Government driven projects are particularly susceptible to this 
type of unintended consequence. This can lead to budget, schedule, and performance issues or failures. Budget cycles 
are annual and the consequences of the budget in 5 or 10 years are often not credibly considered (since situations in 
the country will be different then). This leads to an emphasis on next year’s budget at the expense of the budget in the 
next decade. Although not intended, design decisions are driven by near term cost savings which could increase long 
term costs. Accountability in the Government system reinforces this and it must be actively and consciously addressed 
by the systems engineer in the all phases of the system design and operation. The systems engineer will also need to 
work with program management and organizational management to keep this tendency in check. Part of balancing an 
Watson, Andrews, & Larsen 
8 
 
unintended consequence is to have visible and explicit metrics and cost data to provide a current view of the long term 
consequences. 
Schedule can also be driven by shortsightedness, by making decisions to achieve near term milestones that 
may delay future efforts by months or years. Mission dates are often well known, providing a clear and explicit target 
of the future consequences. Planetary missions, in particular, have “must achieve” dates that keep the near term 
decision drivers in check. Understanding the relationships of today’s decisions to future limitations is a major factor 
in ensuring the system effectiveness in achieving its intended consequences. 
System performance is well understood if the System Application Context is well defined. This provides a 
guard against making near term over longer term performance. System performance can be adversely affected by 
budget and schedule decisions and the consequences of these decisions needs to be clearly understood as part of the 
decision. There can be a tendency to look past these consequences leading to a system with reduced capability or 
failure to meet the mission objectives. The systems engineer is responsible for ensuring these consequences are 
identified and discussed as part of the decision process. Without this understanding, it is easy to reduce or remove 
major system capabilities unintentionally. 
 
Cultural Values 
Cultural values can lead to cultural bias regarding what can and cannot happen. Cultural values exist in every 
organization. Many of these values are positive and help the organization be successful in its execution of system 
design and operation. Cultural values, though, can also create blind spots for the organization. If the organization 
believes that a consequence will not occur, then it will not guard against the consequence (if negative) or pursue the 
consequence (if positive). The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB, 2003) and the Roger’s Commission 
(1986) both cited strong cultural biases leading to the Columbia and Challenger accidents. The organizational culture 
supported the belief that the failure sources were not credible and did not adequately protect against these failures, 
resulting in the two disasters. The systems engineer must first recognize the organizational culture and then protect 
the system design from any cultural bias that may exist. A key to this is considering consequences with objective facts, 
recognizing uncertainties and sensitivities, and providing systems integrating physics-based or mathematically-based 
answers. Cultural bias can be stated more subjectively and may not be based on facts directly relevant to the current 
system. This difference must be understood to avoid culturally induced unintended consequences. 
There are two cognitive biases that should be considered: confirmation bias and over confidence. (Roberto, 
2009)  Confirmation bias seeks to confirm pre-existing understanding (and so avoids specification of ignorance).  This 
bias leads to a focus that what we already know is right. The self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1996, pp. 183-201) is 
a large factor in these situations where no matter the outcome of a situation, the situation is always viewed as 
confirmatory to the cultural belief system.  This can create significant blind spots in system development and 
operations. Opportunity structure having diverse opinions can mitigate confirmation bias.  Over confidence leads to a 
failure to recognize important information about the system.  Signs of emerging issues can be missed and a failure to 
explore unknown phenomena is the result.  This form of bias also results in a failure to specify ignorance of a topic or 
area.  The culture believes it understands and does not recognize the limitations of the actual knowledge of the system, 
its environment, or its application.   
 
Self-Defeating Prophecy 
The self-defeating prophecy (i.e. by stating the hypothesis you induce a set of conditions that prevent the hypothesized 
outcome) is a strong, yet subtle, form of bias in system design and operations decisions. A simple example of this is 
the statement, “All colors being equal, I like blue.”  The hypothesis, “All colors being equal”, is immediately defeated 
by the statement, “I like blue”. Thus placing stronger consideration of blue over all other colors in mind and creating 
a bias towards the color stated. The systems engineer will need to recognize these subtleties in meetings and 
discussions and ensure that problem statements do not contain subjective statements that bias the solution.  
The corollary of the source, the self-fulfilling prophecy, must also be guarded against. The self-fulfilling 
prophecy is complex in action. It involves declaring an option to be the best (or the worst) and interpreting all evidence 
as supporting the conclusion regardless of the outcome. This creates a bias in the design or operations team for or 
against a particular option without objectively considering all aspects of that or the other options. This can be a 
dangerous bias and can lead to system failures or other unexpected/undesirable results. 
The normalization of deviance, (i.e., that the deviated results are expected) (Vaughan, 1996), is another 
similar construct where the abnormal performance becomes expected and then becomes the normal course of the 
system operation. This was cited as a factor in the Columbia accident. (CAIB, 2003) The systems engineer must guard 
against such normalization, keeping the uncertainties and sensitivities before the system design or operations team. 
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Summary 
Sociology provides many functions that exist within the organization. Opportunity structures provide an opportunity 
for the disciplines to mature their ideas and resolve questions and unexpected responses prior to carrying these through 
the decision board process. The systems engineer provides for these in the organizational structure and information 
flow process through the formation of informal status meetings, task teams, working groups, communities of practice, 
etc. as appropriate for the organizational culture and specific system development. The systems engineer should ensure 
that the organization has specified all unknown areas (specification of ignorance) to ensure these are properly 
addressed.  System terminology is important in communication and mathematics provides a means to translate various 
discipline concepts.  Socially expectect durations are also important to be managed as part of the system schedules 
and plans. 
There are many social cultures represented by each discipline group, the line organization, and the project 
organization.  Ensuring these cultures work together and do not create barriers is an important aspect of systems 
engineering.  Social ambivalence, anomie, and dysfunction should be actively addressed with line management and 
project management for the system. 
Reconsideration paths are a key sociological mitigation for those within the organization which encounter a 
social ambivalence on a specific system decision or topic. These paths should not consist of participants in the 
development organizational culture but should be able to discern the sociological as well as the technical forces 
contributing to the perceived conflict in the system. This helps mitigate social responses that can lead to system design 
activities or decision moving outside the organizational structure or attempting to bypass certain decision making 
steps. 
Avoiding unintended consequenses is a large aspect of system engineering, understanding the social basis 
for these consequences is critical to system success.   Unrecognized ignorance, error, and biases all lead to unitended 
results for the system in develop or operation. 
By understanding the social principles involved in discipline integration activities, the systems engineering 
gains a necessary understanding of organizational disruptions to information flow. These principles enable the systems 
engineer to recognize and address information flow patterns for the success of the system. 
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